Farm failure and family fallout leads to Supreme Court ruling on prejudiced shareholders provision

Baker v Hodder [2018] NZSC 78 deals with important company law issues, and at the highest level.  In a sadly familiar set of facts, the case concerned a farming business run on land owned by a family company which was unsuccessful and ultimately became insolvent, forcing the sale of the farm.  It is worth noting as it is the first decision by the Supreme Court on the ‘prejudiced shareholders provision’, a widely relied upon provision in the Companies Act 1993 (“the Companies Act”).

Background

Kadd Farm Limited (the Company) was a family company with its shareholders being Wallace and Ann Hodder (70%) and Duncan and Kathryn Baker (30%).  Kathryn Baker is Wallace and Ann Hodder’s daughter.

The Company owned a farm known as Heron Creek.  The farm was run by the Bakers and the Company leased the farm to Mr Baker’s company, DB Contracting Agriculture Ltd (DB Contracting).  Unfortunately, the Bakers were unsuccessful in their enterprise and DB Contracting defaulted under the lease causing the Company to default under its mortgage.

The farm was ultimately put on the market and offers were received.  The shareholders did not agree on an appropriate counteroffer to those offers.  The Hodders made a counteroffer on behalf of the Company without consultation or agreement by the Bakers.  An agreement for sale and purchase was signed.  As the sale constituted a major transaction for the Company, the agreement was conditional on the necessary approval of at least 75% of the shareholders required by section 129 of the Companies Act (a special resolution).  The Bakers refused to sign a special resolution approving the sale.

High Court decision

The Hodders sought relief under section 174 of the Companies Act alleging that the Bakers’ refusal to sign a special resolution was oppressive and/or unfairly prejudicial to the Hodders and the Company.

The High Court truncated the timetable for the proceedings on the basis that the matter was urgent (though it was acknowledged that there may have been some artificiality to the urgency given that the proposed purchasers were already in possession of the farm).  It held that the refusal to sign constituted prejudicial conduct and ordered the Bakers to sign a special resolution allowing the sale of the farm.  Further to this, the High Court refused to stay its decision to allow the Bakers to appeal it.

The Bakers signed a resolution in compliance with the Court order and Heron Creek was sold.

Court of Appeal decision

The Bakers unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot as the farm had already been sold.

Supreme Court

The Bakers sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Although the Supreme Court accepted that the appeal was moot in the sense that the farm had been sold it decided that the Court of Appeal should have heard the appeal on the basis that:

  • The award of costs may be reversed on appeal;
  • The High Court decision raised important questions about the interaction between sections 129 and 174 of the Companies Act; and
  • The truncation of the process in circumstances where the outcome was final, rather than interlocutory, was unfair.
Unfair process

The Supreme Court held that:

  • the truncation of the process;
  • the High Court’s order requiring the Bakers to sign the special resolution was not a matter that had been the subject of pleading or advance notice; and
  • the final determination made by the High Court might stand in the way of any future proceedings by the Bakers against the Hodders,

all which unfairly affected the Bakers’ presentation of their case.

Prejudiced shareholders provision

Commonly, applications of prejudicial conduct arise in the context of small, family owned companies.  In these companies there is often an understanding that all shareholders will take part in the business and it transpires that either a shareholder is excluded from the management of the company, or its corresponding director fails to pull his or her weight.  Courts have very wide powers to make an order to remedy the prejudicial conduct, though such orders are usually in the form of liquidation or forced share sales.

In the High Court the Hodders argued that the Company’s position and their position as shareholders were unfairly prejudiced by the Bakers’ refusal to sign a special resolution.  The High Court confirmed that they were prejudiced in their capacities as directors and shareholders on the basis that unless the farm was sold, the Company’s debts would increase with no prospect of repayment.  It took full advantage of the wide powers available to it to remedy the prejudicial conduct in ordering the Bakers to sign a special resolution under section 129 of the Companies Act.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court’s decision.  As part of its discussion of the prejudiced shareholders provision, the Supreme Court referred to the Law Commission’s report recommending company law reform (Law Commission Company Law: Reform and Restatement (NZLC R9, 1989) along with the explanatory note to the Companies Bill 1990.  It confirmed that in most circumstances, including voting on major transactions, shareholders can vote according to self-interest and they are not subject to the obligations imposed on directors.  This is a fundamental principle of company law.

The Supreme Court rather sensibly held that the Bakers were merely exercising their rights as shareholders by withholding their approval under section 129.  It confirmed that the Bakers did not owe any statutory duty to the Company or to the Hodders in relation to the sale of the farm (meaning there was no prejudicial conduct in refusing to sign the special resolution).

Relationship between sections 129 and 174

The Supreme Court confirmed that the language in section 174 was not properly suited to the Bakers’ case, where the oppression complained of consisted of a shareholder invoking the right to decline to approve a major transaction under section 129.  However, it noted section 174(3) which allows an order to be made against a person other than the relevant company, including a shareholder, suggesting that section 174 could apply.

Company members must take care when drafting documents such as constitutions or shareholders agreements to ensure that no unintended duties are created which might give rise to an action under section 174 (and conversely any intended duties are accurately recorded).  In some relief, the Supreme Court issued a cautionary note confirming that the power to make an order against a person other than a company under section 174 should be exercised very carefully.

The Court’s decision is sound and ensures the fundamental principles of company law protecting shareholders are maintained.

Conclusion

Ultimately the Bakers were successful in their appeal.  The Supreme Court confirmed that the Court of Appeal should have heard the Bakers’ case and the order made under section 174 was quashed.

Amanda is an Associate in our Commercial Team, specialising in Company Law,  and can be contacted on 07 958 7451.

Authority figures: Company contracting and Bishop v Autumn Tree

In the recent Court of Appeal case of Bishop Warden Property Holdings Limited v Autumn Tree Limited, a director of a property development company, Tina, entered into an agreement to sell the company’s major property asset at a price significantly below value.  At some stage before signing, the purchaser checked the Companies Office register for the company, which apparently showed that Tina was the sole director of the company.  The parties signed the agreement at approximately 6pm on 3 August 2017.

However earlier that day, the company had registered another director, Anna.  This meant that at the time the agreement was signed, only one of two directors had signed it.  Tina claimed that she was the sole director at the time the agreement was signed and that she had full authority to sign it.  The purchaser, which was attempting to prove that the agreement was valid and gave rise to interests in the property, agreed with Tina’s assertion.

Authority to contract

The Court of Appeal noted that in most circumstances, a party entering into a contract with a company will be entitled to assume that the company has complied with all its internal procedures to authorise its entry into the contract, and that the agreement is valid.

Section 18 of the Companies Act 1993 was enacted for this very purpose – it provides that a company cannot assert non-compliance, lack of authority or invalidity of a document against a third party on the basis that the company did not comply with the Act or its constitution, or that a person named as a director on the register or held out by the company as a director has in fact not been appointed and did not have authority to enter into the document.

Simply put, a company cannot use its own failure to comply with its own procedures as an excuse to get out of an agreement with a third party, if it has represented that the transaction is otherwise valid.

However in the Autumn Tree case, the Court found that the purchaser could not rely on this assumption to protect the validity of the agreement.  While a sole director may enter into a significant contract on behalf of the company, a director who is one of multiple directors would not customarily have authority to do so, without express authorisation from the company to the contrary, such as a directors’ and/or shareholders’ resolution, depending on the transaction.  In the case of “major transactions”, shareholder approval will generally be required.

At the time the agreement was signed, Tina was not the sole director of the company as Anna had already been registered as a director.  The company had held out (by virtue of the Companies Office register entry) that both Anna and Tina were registered as directors.  One of two directors of a property development company would not customarily have authority to unilaterally enter into a significant property transaction, and Tina did not have any other express authority from the company to enter into the agreement alone.

Exceptions – actual and constructive knowledge

It makes sense that a person will not be able to rely on section 18 if they have actual knowledge of a defect in authority.  The Court in Autumn Tree noted that actual knowledge went so far as to include “wilful blindness” – where a person is sufficiently aware that something is wrong, but deliberately avoids further investigation.

There is a further exception to the protections of section 18 on the basis of constructive knowledge of a defect, found in the proviso: “unless the person has, or ought to have, by virtue of his or her position with or relationship to the company, knowledge …”.

The Court in Autumn Tree confirmed the prior approach by the High Court in Equiticorp, that if a person has an ongoing relationship with a company and by virtue of that relationship knows or ought to know that, for example, a signing director does not have authority, or that someone being held out by the company as a director is actually not one, that person cannot rely on section 18 to protect a contract.

Buyer beware

This case serves as a red flag to parties dealing with a director of a company who is flying solo – whether they are the only director or one of several is a critical point to check before entering into a contract.  If they are a sole director, make sure you are working from the most up-to-date Companies Office register entry.  If they are one of multiple directors purporting to act alone on behalf of the company, it is not unreasonable to ask for further evidence of sufficient actual authority of the company.  One director signing on behalf of a company with a board of several, even with a witnessed signature, may not be enough.

Jessica is a Senior Solicitor in our Commercial Team and can be contacted on 07 958 7436.

Health and safety fines – Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand [2018] NZHC 2020

Since the passing of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (“HSWA”), there has been some confusion as to how the Court should approach health and safety sentencing.  After a number of inconsistent decisions in the District Court, Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand has provided helpful clarification, maintaining the existing model for fines under the previous legislation and Department of Labour v Hanham & Philp Contractors Ltd , and clarifying the extent of discounts applied to fines for mitigating factors.

The case will be of particular interest to clients operating in industries such as forestry, construction and mining where higher-risk activities are often undertaken.

Approach to sentencing

The Court set out four steps to sentencing under the HSWA:

  • Assess the amount of reparation to be paid to any victim;
  • Fix the amount of the fine by reference to culpability bands, and then adjust that amount for any aggravating and mitigating factors;
  • Determine whether any further orders available under the HSWA are required (such as orders for the payment of WorkSafe’s costs, adverse publicity orders, training orders, restoration orders or project orders); and
  • Make an overall assessment of the proportionality and appropriateness of the total imposition of reparation and fine on the defendant, including consideration of the defendant’s financial capacity.
Fines

The previous District Court decisions had differed in the number of culpability bands used to identify a starting point for a fine.  The appellants in Stumpmaster criticised the District Court decisions as being excessive and lacking principle in their approach.  The High Court retained similar proportionate levels as under Hanham & Philp Contractors Ltd, but set out four new guideline bands for fixing the fine:

  • Low culpability (up to $250,000);
  • Medium culpability (between $250,000 and $600,000);
  • High culpability (between $600,000 and $1,000,000); and
  • Very high culpability ($1,000,000 plus).
Mitigating factors

The High Court also provided further clarification as to in what circumstances large discounts should be made available.  Large discounts of 30% will only be provided in cases that exhibit all mitigating factors to a moderate degree, or one or more mitigating factors to a high degree.  Mitigating factors include payment of reparation, remorse and co-operation with WorkSafe, remedial actions, and favourable safety records.

Conclusion

Employers should respond immediately and appropriately to any incident.  It will be important for an employer to show the extent to which it assisted the people affected by an incident.

If you would like further information please contact Renika Siciliano on 07 958 7429.

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