No more letting fees

Under the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, letting fees covering the costs incurred by letting agents (usually property managers) have been able to be charged to tenants.  A letting fee is any charge relating to granting, continuing, extending, varying, renewing or assigning or sub-letting under the tenancy agreement.  Under the Residential Tenancies (Prohibiting Letting Fees) Amendment Act 2018 (“the Act”), in force from 12 December 2018, the charging of letting fees will be banned.

The Bill was introduced on 22 March 2018 and received Royal assent on 6 November 2018.  The timeframe between Royal assent and commencement has been shortened from the prior commencement date of 3 months following Royal assent, to coming into force on 12 December 2018.  This is as New Zealand’s tenancy turnover is highest between November and February.  The earlier commencement date helps to maximise the reduction in costs for new tenants.  The Act is not retrospective, and does not apply to any letting fees charged within a tenancy agreement entered into prior to 12 December 2018.

From the commencement date, any charging of letting fees is deemed an “unlawful act” – this includes charging any fees of the kind discussed above, by whatever name called.  Some property managers are introducing new fees to charge to landlords to cover the cost of finding tenants, such as “Tenancy Fees” or “Admin Fees”.  Landlords should be aware that these fees cannot be passed on to the tenant as they are simply letting fees with different names.  Anyone who is found to have unlawfully charged a letting fee could be liable for up to $1,000 in exemplary damages.

This does not have any impact on the ability to charge rent in advance or a bond.  It further does not impact the landlord’s ability to recover reasonable expenses from a tenant where expenses are incurred from the tenant wishing to reassign or sublet.  Letting agents are still able to be used, however the landlord must meet the costs of this themselves instead of passing them on to the tenants.

Dale acknowledges the assistance of Kaylee Bird in preparing this article.

Dale is a Senior Associate in our Property Team and can be contacted on 07 958 7428.

Testamentary promises

What is a “testamentary promise”?

A testamentary promise is a promise made by one person (“Person A”) to another (“Person B”) that Person B will receive compensation for providing services to Person A.  For example, Person B might mow Person A’s lawns every week on Person A’s promise that Person B will be repaid out of Person A’s estate when they die.

If Person A were to neglect to provide for a promise in their will, Person B can bring a testamentary promises claim under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 (“the Act”).  If, after evaluating all of the facts, a Court is satisfied that Person A made a testamentary promise to Person B in return for services received, the Court can order the executor/administrator of Person A’s estate to pay the claimant a reasonable amount (having regard to a number of factors in that particular circumstance).

Testamentary promises can be made in writing or orally. When a promise is made orally, it can be more difficult to prove that a Promise was made.  Nevertheless, the Court will consider all of the facts of the case before making a decision.

There is a time limit to make a testamentary promises claim.  A potential claimant has only 12 months from the grant of probate to bring a claim (however, this time limit can be extended by the Court if the estate has not been distributed).

How do you prove a testamentary promise exists?

There are four requirements to prove a testamentary promise exists. There must be (incorporating Person A and B from the above explanation):

  • Work or services done by Person B for Person A;
  • An express or implicit promise from Person A to Person B;
  • A causal link between the promise made and the work or services done; and
  • Insufficient remuneration.

Tawhai v Govorko & Anor [2015] NZHC 2874 expands on these four requirements to aid understanding.

“Work or services” encompasses both the normal definition of the terms and wider constructions including companionship, affection, and emotional support.  In such cases, what is provided must go beyond what would normally be expected of a family member/friend.

“An express or implied promise” must amount to an intention to reward in the form of a testamentary provision for the claimant.  Such an intention could be an express statement or implied – this has been interpreted widely where a plain case is presented.

The ‘causal link’ required is that the promise must be intended as a reward for the work or services provided.  Where there is a promise to make some testamentary provision for the claimant, but there is no link to the work or services provided, the claim will fail.

The final requirement of insufficient remuneration means the claimant could not have been otherwise compensated for the work or services provided.  For example, in Tawhai there was a promise to “get the lot”, yet the claimant only received approximately half of the estate.  This was considered a failure to fulfil the promise made.

What will the Court consider?

In addition to the four requirements above, the Court will also consider a number of other factors specific to the particular circumstances.  Factors the Court will consider include:

  • The situation in which the promise was made;
  • The work that was carried out;
  • The value of the work that was carried out;
  • The value of the promise made;
  • The value of the deceased’s estate; and
  • Whether there are any other claims against the estate (and if so, the nature and value of those claims).
So how does all of this apply to you?

Due to the strict requirements that a Court must prove in order to satisfy a testamentary promises claim, it can be very difficult for someone to access the money that you have promised them.  In some instances, there is not enough evidence to prove the claim existed and the claimant received nothing.  The process of making a testamentary promises claim can also be quite an expensive and time consuming process.

If there is a specific person that you would like to leave money to when you pass away, whether it be for providing services or otherwise, the best option is to reflect this in a will and to discuss your options with a lawyer.

If you would like further information please contact Amanda Hockley on 07 958 7451.

Invalidity of Wills

Recent cases have outlined important considerations regarding the requirements necessary to prove a Will to be invalid.  There is some confusion around the grounds upon which a Will can be challenged, leading to unnecessary costs in questioning the validity of a Will.

There are several ways a Will can be challenged.  In brief:

  • If the Will has not been made in accordance with the Wills Act 2007 (including disputes regarding the Will-maker’s capacity);
  • If a family member was not provided for under the Family Protection Act 1955;
  • If a promise was made to provide for someone under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949; and
  • Where a surviving spouse or partner is not satisfied with what they have been given under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.
Wills Act 2007

Under this Act, the validity of a Will might be challenged on the following grounds:

  • The Will was not properly signed and witnessed;
  • The Will-maker did not have full mental capacity;
  • The Will-maker did not know what was in the Will when they signed it; and/or
  • The terms of the Will have been affected by fraud or undue influence.

Mumby v Mumby sets out the considerations that the Court will take into account when assessing the validity of a Will.  In this case it was argued that prior to her death Mrs Mumby was not pleased with the contents of her Will, however level of satisfaction is not a relevant consideration in determining validity.  It is important to note that the testator’s happiness with the provisions of the Will are not valid grounds upon which to challenge a Will – only the testator’s understanding of the provisions.  A lack of understanding of the provisions of the Will constitutes valid grounds to challenge the Will as it indicates that the Will-maker did not have full mental capacity – this is not the case with a lack of happiness relating to the provisions.

Family Protection Act 1955 (FPA)

Under the FPA a person is responsible for the proper maintenance of certain family members.  This includes:

  • Spouse/partner;
  • De-facto partner;
  • Children;
  • Grandchildren;
  • Stepchildren maintained wholly or partly; and
  • In some cases, parents.

If proper provisions are not made in the Will for the proper maintenance of those mentioned above, they can make a claim in the Courts asking for provision to be made for them out of the estate.

Courteney v Courteney stresses the importance of recognising the moral duty you have to your children to provide for them following your death.  Where children are deliberately and wrongfully excluded from a Will due to clouded judgment on behalf of the Will-maker, constituting a lack of capacity, a breach of moral duty will be found.  For this reason, it is important to understand to whom you are obligated to provide for in your Will, and if you decide to exclude any such people, to seek legal advice to minimise the risk of a dispute in the future.

Moon v Public Trust shows that a de-facto partnership is not limited to couples who have lived together for three years or more.  Whether or not a relationship is de-facto will depend on the nature of the individual circumstances – for example, a couple who have been together for 27 years is likely to give rise to a moral duty to provide for one another, even when they have never lived together.  It is therefore relevant to consider significant relationships that may give rise to a moral duty even if the relationship does not strictly qualify as a de-facto partnership.

Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949

Under the Testamentary Promises Act, where a promise was made by the deceased while they were alive but failed to be recognised in the Will, a person may seek provision for this promise from the estate.  It must be found that:

  • Work or services were provided to the deceased;
  • There was a promise of reward;
  • There is a link between the work/services and the promise; and
  • That no reward was ever given.

McBeth v Morrison (Wendt Estate) showed that where there is no link between the work and the promise of a reward, the application will fail.  As such, where the work/services provided were given with no expectation of reward, there cannot be sufficient nexus between the work/services and the promise.  A testamentary promise will only be upheld where, among the above factors, the work/services were provided with the knowledge that a reward would be received.

Kaylee is a Law Clerk in our Asset Planning Team.

How the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering of Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 law affects our clients

Why we need to ask you for information

New Zealand has passed a law called the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (“the AML/CFT law” for short). The purpose of the law reflects New Zealand’s commitment to the international initiative to counter the impact that criminal activity has on people and economies within the global community.

Recent changes to the AML/CFT Act mean that from 1 July 2018 lawyers must comply with its requirements. Lawyers must do a number of things to help combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to help Police bring criminals to justice. The AML/CFT law does this because the services law firms and other professionals offer may be attractive to those involved in criminal activity.

The law says that law firms and other professionals must assess the risk they may face from the actions of money launderers and people who finance terrorism and must identify potentially suspicious activity. To make that assessment, lawyers must obtain and verify information from prospective and existing clients about a range of things. This is part of what the AML/CFT law calls “customer due diligence”.

Customer due diligence requirements

Customer due diligence requires a law firm to undertake certain background checks before providing services to clients or customers. Lawyers must take reasonable steps to make sure the information they receive from clients is correct, and so they need to ask for documents that show this. We will need to obtain and verify certain information from you to meet these legal requirements.

To confirm details including your name, date of birth and address, the following certified documents (or similar) will be required:

  • Identity documents such as New Zealand passport or driver’s licence and birth certificate, and
  • Address documents such as a bank or rates statement dated within the last three months.

If you are seeing us about company or trust business, we will need information about the company or trust including the people associated with it (such as directors and shareholders, trustees and beneficiaries).

We may also need to ask you for further information. We will need to ask you about the nature and purpose of the proposed work you are asking us to do for you. Information confirming the source of funds for a transaction may also be necessary to meet the legal requirements.

If you cannot provide the required information

If you are not able to provide the required information, it is likely we will not be able to act for you.  As the law applies to everyone, we need to ask for the information even if you are a longstanding client of ours.

Prior to commencing work, we will confirm the documents and information required.

If you would like further information please contact Laura Monahan on 07 958 7479.

Greenpeace: Charitable status decision

The recent decision by the Independent Charities Registration Board (“the Board”) that Greenpeace does not qualify for charitable status provides further guidance for charities regarding political purposes, ancillary purposes, and illegal purposes.

Greenpeace background

The stated purposes of Greenpeace include to:

  • Promote interconnectivity between humans and the planet;
  • Promote the protection of the environment (including promotion of elimination of all weapons of mass destruction);
  • Identify, research and monitor issues affecting these purposes;
  • Develop public awareness;
  • Promote education on environmental issues;
  • Co-operate with organisations with similar objects to Greenpeace; and
  • Promote the adoption of legislation which further the above.  This was amended to be clearly ancillary to the other stated purposes.

These purposes are capable of being charitable, however the question for the Board was how the end goals were furthered by Greenpeace.

Charitable purpose to protect the environment

It was considered that Greenpeace largely promoted personal views on environmental issues.  It is not possible to say whether the views promoted are of benefit to the public in the way the law recognises is charitable.  As public benefit cannot be found, Greenpeace’s purpose cannot be held to be charitable.

Greenpeace’s purpose could still be considered charitable if the non-charitable purpose, of advocating for the protection of the environment, is merely ancillary to an identified charitable purpose.  The Board considered that the primary focus of Greenpeace’s activities has been promoting its point of view on environmental issues, thus cannot be considered ancillary to an identified charitable purpose.

Charitable purpose to advance education

The test in Re Collier [1998] 1 NZLR 81 (HC) is that for research to qualify as educational it must:

  • Convey a public benefit in that it somehow assists the training of mind or advances research;
  • Not amount to propaganda or cause under the guise of education; and
  • Reach some minimum standard.

The Board considered that to advance education, information must be presented in a balanced, objective and neutral manner so that the reader can form a view for themselves.  There can be no intention to persuade the public to a particular point of view.  Although some of Greenpeace’s reports are structured as research, the reports lack an independent and objective starting point in their analysis.  It was considered that Greenpeace’s reports seek to promote their particular point of view on environmental issues rather than to educate.

Charitable purpose to promote peace

The Board considered that Greenpeace’s activities in this area amounted to promoting its own particular points of view, thus it was not possible to confer public benefit and the purposes could not be considered charitable.  Further, the stated purpose to promote peace is expressed as a primary purpose that can be carried out independently from all other purposes, and thus is not merely ancillary to an identified charitable purpose.

Illegal purpose

The Board identified eight instances from 2011-2017 where there were activities that may have involved illegality carried out by Greenpeace’s members in New Zealand, including unlawfully being on property, trespass, resisting police, obstructing a public way, bill sticking, and disturbing meetings.  The Board noted that annual training included training for specialist climb and boat teams, which suggests that Greenpeace authorises and directly coordinates illegal activities such as trespass on ships and buildings.  For this reason, it was found that Greenpeace’s illegal activities form part of a pattern of behaviour and are not isolated breaches.  Taking into account the above, the Board found that Greenpeace has an illegal non-charitable purpose that disqualifies it from registration.

Decision

The Board considered that Greenpeace had an independent purpose to advocate its own particular views on environmental issues and peace/weapons that could not be sufficiently determined to be for the public benefit in a way previously accepted as charitable by the Courts.  Greenpeace also had an illegal purpose that disqualified it from being a registered charity.

The Board decided that Greenpeace does not qualify for registration as a charitable entity because it is not established for exclusively charitable purposes.

Learnings

Advocacy will not be considered a charitable purpose where it is promoting a particular view and is not ancillary to a main charitable purpose, in other words if advocacy is a main purpose of an organisation.  Further, a purpose will not be considered charitable through the advancement of education where information is merely collated from other areas or does not provide a complete factual view.  Involvement in illegal activity, even where remote, is likely to cause the automatic failure of the application for charitable status.  These are all important factors to keep in mind when applying for registration as a charity or when considering the activities of a registered charity.

Kaylee is a Law Clerk in our Asset Planning Team.

Will Kits: DIY gone wrong?

Online wills or do it yourself will kits seem to be a popular new trend and could be due to a number of factors.  For example, people often put off making and signing their wills until they are going overseas and they feel a sense of urgency to ‘get their affairs in order’, and sometimes it is the simple fact that online wills or will kits are seen as more cost effective.

However, are online wills or DIY will kits, especially without a lawyer’s oversight, the most effective way to ‘get your affairs in order’?

In the recent case of Mills v Laboyrie [2018] NZHC 1368, the question before the High Court was whether or not a partially completed will from a will kit satisfied section 14 of the Wills Act 2007.

For a will to be declared valid under section 14, it has to satisfy the following requirements:

  • the document has to appear to be a will;
  • the document does not fall within section 11 of the Wills Act 2007 (for example, it is not signed and witnessed by two independent people);
  • the document came into existence in or out of New Zealand; and
  • the document expresses the deceased person’s testamentary intentions.
Background

The deceased was Stephen Mills who died of complications with multiple sclerosis on 14 April 2017.  At the time of his death, Stephen lived in the family home and required daily care.

Stephen was one of eight siblings.  Stephen’s brother Terence was involved with Stephen’s care and seemed to be the only sibling that understood Stephen’s fear of leaving the family home and being placed into a care facility.  Terence was involved in building work and was working on making Stephen’s home more accessible as Stephen’s disease progressed.  Some of Stephen’s other siblings had been exploring arrangements for him to be placed into a full-time care facility.

On 10 April 2017, a few days before his death, Stephen’s carer obtained a will kit at Stephen’s request.  The document was drafted by Stephen’s carer, but dictated by Stephen.  The provisions of the document were read back to Stephen and he verbally indicated to his carer that the document outlined his wishes.  The resulting partially completed document left everything to Terence.

A Justice of the Peace was organised by Terence to formalise the will on 12 April 2017 by witnessing Stephen sign the will.  However, prior to this occurring, Stephen was hospitalised and subsequently died without formalising the will.

An earlier draft will, prepared seven or so years prior to Stephen’s death, provided for equal distribution between all but one of the siblings.

High Court decision

The Court determined that section 14 of the Wills Act applied to the will kit document and could be declared a valid will if Jagose J was satisfied that it expressed Stephen’s testamentary intentions.

Jagose J cited Re Campbell (deceased) [2014] NZHC 1632, [2014] 3 NZLR 706 (HC) at [18] where it was observed that:

“… section 14 [is] a remedial provision, and that where there is evidence of the deceased person’s testamentary intentions, it is better that those intentions be given effect, in preference to the disposition of property which would take effect under any previous will, or on an intestacy.”

Jagose J found that as Terence appeared to be the only sibling that understood Stephen’s fears about moving into permanent care, it seemed consistent with Stephen’s desire that he wanted Terence to be the recipient of his estate.

Based on the factual circumstances and evidence, the Court held that the partially completed will kit document did express Stephen’s testamentary intentions and it was therefore declared a valid will.

Conclusion

Although the Court found that the will kit document was a valid will in accordance with the Wills Act 2007 in this case, having a will declared valid by the High Court is not the most cost effective way to deal with your asset planning matters, and can add further stress to grieving family members.

While online wills and will kits may be good initial first steps in getting your affairs in order, there are benefits to be gained by involving a lawyer in your asset planning matters.  A lawyer can advise you of the laws that may impact on the provisions of your will.  For example, there are relationship property and family protection laws that may trump some of the specific wishes in your will.  Asset planning matters you already have in place, such as a trust, also need to be taken into account.  Lawyers can advise you on the possible effects and implications of your wishes.  Lawyers will also use their best endeavours to see that a will is completed in accordance with the terms of the Wills Act so that you can be rest assured your affairs are in order and are less likely to be subject to Court scrutiny.

Natalie is a Solicitor in our Commercial and Asset Planning Teams and can be contacted on 07 958 7435.

Farm failure and family fallout leads to Supreme Court ruling on prejudiced shareholders provision

Baker v Hodder [2018] NZSC 78 deals with important company law issues, and at the highest level.  In a sadly familiar set of facts, the case concerned a farming business run on land owned by a family company which was unsuccessful and ultimately became insolvent, forcing the sale of the farm.  It is worth noting as it is the first decision by the Supreme Court on the ‘prejudiced shareholders provision’, a widely relied upon provision in the Companies Act 1993 (“the Companies Act”).

Background

Kadd Farm Limited (the Company) was a family company with its shareholders being Wallace and Ann Hodder (70%) and Duncan and Kathryn Baker (30%).  Kathryn Baker is Wallace and Ann Hodder’s daughter.

The Company owned a farm known as Heron Creek.  The farm was run by the Bakers and the Company leased the farm to Mr Baker’s company, DB Contracting Agriculture Ltd (DB Contracting).  Unfortunately, the Bakers were unsuccessful in their enterprise and DB Contracting defaulted under the lease causing the Company to default under its mortgage.

The farm was ultimately put on the market and offers were received.  The shareholders did not agree on an appropriate counteroffer to those offers.  The Hodders made a counteroffer on behalf of the Company without consultation or agreement by the Bakers.  An agreement for sale and purchase was signed.  As the sale constituted a major transaction for the Company, the agreement was conditional on the necessary approval of at least 75% of the shareholders required by section 129 of the Companies Act (a special resolution).  The Bakers refused to sign a special resolution approving the sale.

High Court decision

The Hodders sought relief under section 174 of the Companies Act alleging that the Bakers’ refusal to sign a special resolution was oppressive and/or unfairly prejudicial to the Hodders and the Company.

The High Court truncated the timetable for the proceedings on the basis that the matter was urgent (though it was acknowledged that there may have been some artificiality to the urgency given that the proposed purchasers were already in possession of the farm).  It held that the refusal to sign constituted prejudicial conduct and ordered the Bakers to sign a special resolution allowing the sale of the farm.  Further to this, the High Court refused to stay its decision to allow the Bakers to appeal it.

The Bakers signed a resolution in compliance with the Court order and Heron Creek was sold.

Court of Appeal decision

The Bakers unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot as the farm had already been sold.

Supreme Court

The Bakers sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Although the Supreme Court accepted that the appeal was moot in the sense that the farm had been sold it decided that the Court of Appeal should have heard the appeal on the basis that:

  • The award of costs may be reversed on appeal;
  • The High Court decision raised important questions about the interaction between sections 129 and 174 of the Companies Act; and
  • The truncation of the process in circumstances where the outcome was final, rather than interlocutory, was unfair.
Unfair process

The Supreme Court held that:

  • the truncation of the process;
  • the High Court’s order requiring the Bakers to sign the special resolution was not a matter that had been the subject of pleading or advance notice; and
  • the final determination made by the High Court might stand in the way of any future proceedings by the Bakers against the Hodders,

all which unfairly affected the Bakers’ presentation of their case.

Prejudiced shareholders provision

Commonly, applications of prejudicial conduct arise in the context of small, family owned companies.  In these companies there is often an understanding that all shareholders will take part in the business and it transpires that either a shareholder is excluded from the management of the company, or its corresponding director fails to pull his or her weight.  Courts have very wide powers to make an order to remedy the prejudicial conduct, though such orders are usually in the form of liquidation or forced share sales.

In the High Court the Hodders argued that the Company’s position and their position as shareholders were unfairly prejudiced by the Bakers’ refusal to sign a special resolution.  The High Court confirmed that they were prejudiced in their capacities as directors and shareholders on the basis that unless the farm was sold, the Company’s debts would increase with no prospect of repayment.  It took full advantage of the wide powers available to it to remedy the prejudicial conduct in ordering the Bakers to sign a special resolution under section 129 of the Companies Act.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court’s decision.  As part of its discussion of the prejudiced shareholders provision, the Supreme Court referred to the Law Commission’s report recommending company law reform (Law Commission Company Law: Reform and Restatement (NZLC R9, 1989) along with the explanatory note to the Companies Bill 1990.  It confirmed that in most circumstances, including voting on major transactions, shareholders can vote according to self-interest and they are not subject to the obligations imposed on directors.  This is a fundamental principle of company law.

The Supreme Court rather sensibly held that the Bakers were merely exercising their rights as shareholders by withholding their approval under section 129.  It confirmed that the Bakers did not owe any statutory duty to the Company or to the Hodders in relation to the sale of the farm (meaning there was no prejudicial conduct in refusing to sign the special resolution).

Relationship between sections 129 and 174

The Supreme Court confirmed that the language in section 174 was not properly suited to the Bakers’ case, where the oppression complained of consisted of a shareholder invoking the right to decline to approve a major transaction under section 129.  However, it noted section 174(3) which allows an order to be made against a person other than the relevant company, including a shareholder, suggesting that section 174 could apply.

Company members must take care when drafting documents such as constitutions or shareholders agreements to ensure that no unintended duties are created which might give rise to an action under section 174 (and conversely any intended duties are accurately recorded).  In some relief, the Supreme Court issued a cautionary note confirming that the power to make an order against a person other than a company under section 174 should be exercised very carefully.

The Court’s decision is sound and ensures the fundamental principles of company law protecting shareholders are maintained.

Conclusion

Ultimately the Bakers were successful in their appeal.  The Supreme Court confirmed that the Court of Appeal should have heard the Bakers’ case and the order made under section 174 was quashed.

Amanda is an Associate in our Commercial Team, specialising in Company Law,  and can be contacted on 07 958 7451.

Authority figures: Company contracting and Bishop v Autumn Tree

In the recent Court of Appeal case of Bishop Warden Property Holdings Limited v Autumn Tree Limited, a director of a property development company, Tina, entered into an agreement to sell the company’s major property asset at a price significantly below value.  At some stage before signing, the purchaser checked the Companies Office register for the company, which apparently showed that Tina was the sole director of the company.  The parties signed the agreement at approximately 6pm on 3 August 2017.

However earlier that day, the company had registered another director, Anna.  This meant that at the time the agreement was signed, only one of two directors had signed it.  Tina claimed that she was the sole director at the time the agreement was signed and that she had full authority to sign it.  The purchaser, which was attempting to prove that the agreement was valid and gave rise to interests in the property, agreed with Tina’s assertion.

Authority to contract

The Court of Appeal noted that in most circumstances, a party entering into a contract with a company will be entitled to assume that the company has complied with all its internal procedures to authorise its entry into the contract, and that the agreement is valid.

Section 18 of the Companies Act 1993 was enacted for this very purpose – it provides that a company cannot assert non-compliance, lack of authority or invalidity of a document against a third party on the basis that the company did not comply with the Act or its constitution, or that a person named as a director on the register or held out by the company as a director has in fact not been appointed and did not have authority to enter into the document.

Simply put, a company cannot use its own failure to comply with its own procedures as an excuse to get out of an agreement with a third party, if it has represented that the transaction is otherwise valid.

However in the Autumn Tree case, the Court found that the purchaser could not rely on this assumption to protect the validity of the agreement.  While a sole director may enter into a significant contract on behalf of the company, a director who is one of multiple directors would not customarily have authority to do so, without express authorisation from the company to the contrary, such as a directors’ and/or shareholders’ resolution, depending on the transaction.  In the case of “major transactions”, shareholder approval will generally be required.

At the time the agreement was signed, Tina was not the sole director of the company as Anna had already been registered as a director.  The company had held out (by virtue of the Companies Office register entry) that both Anna and Tina were registered as directors.  One of two directors of a property development company would not customarily have authority to unilaterally enter into a significant property transaction, and Tina did not have any other express authority from the company to enter into the agreement alone.

Exceptions – actual and constructive knowledge

It makes sense that a person will not be able to rely on section 18 if they have actual knowledge of a defect in authority.  The Court in Autumn Tree noted that actual knowledge went so far as to include “wilful blindness” – where a person is sufficiently aware that something is wrong, but deliberately avoids further investigation.

There is a further exception to the protections of section 18 on the basis of constructive knowledge of a defect, found in the proviso: “unless the person has, or ought to have, by virtue of his or her position with or relationship to the company, knowledge …”.

The Court in Autumn Tree confirmed the prior approach by the High Court in Equiticorp, that if a person has an ongoing relationship with a company and by virtue of that relationship knows or ought to know that, for example, a signing director does not have authority, or that someone being held out by the company as a director is actually not one, that person cannot rely on section 18 to protect a contract.

Buyer beware

This case serves as a red flag to parties dealing with a director of a company who is flying solo – whether they are the only director or one of several is a critical point to check before entering into a contract.  If they are a sole director, make sure you are working from the most up-to-date Companies Office register entry.  If they are one of multiple directors purporting to act alone on behalf of the company, it is not unreasonable to ask for further evidence of sufficient actual authority of the company.  One director signing on behalf of a company with a board of several, even with a witnessed signature, may not be enough.

Jessica is a Senior Solicitor in our Commercial Team and can be contacted on 07 958 7436.

Health and safety fines – Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand [2018] NZHC 2020

Since the passing of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (“HSWA”), there has been some confusion as to how the Court should approach health and safety sentencing.  After a number of inconsistent decisions in the District Court, Stumpmaster v WorkSafe New Zealand has provided helpful clarification, maintaining the existing model for fines under the previous legislation and Department of Labour v Hanham & Philp Contractors Ltd , and clarifying the extent of discounts applied to fines for mitigating factors.

The case will be of particular interest to clients operating in industries such as forestry, construction and mining where higher-risk activities are often undertaken.

Approach to sentencing

The Court set out four steps to sentencing under the HSWA:

  • Assess the amount of reparation to be paid to any victim;
  • Fix the amount of the fine by reference to culpability bands, and then adjust that amount for any aggravating and mitigating factors;
  • Determine whether any further orders available under the HSWA are required (such as orders for the payment of WorkSafe’s costs, adverse publicity orders, training orders, restoration orders or project orders); and
  • Make an overall assessment of the proportionality and appropriateness of the total imposition of reparation and fine on the defendant, including consideration of the defendant’s financial capacity.
Fines

The previous District Court decisions had differed in the number of culpability bands used to identify a starting point for a fine.  The appellants in Stumpmaster criticised the District Court decisions as being excessive and lacking principle in their approach.  The High Court retained similar proportionate levels as under Hanham & Philp Contractors Ltd, but set out four new guideline bands for fixing the fine:

  • Low culpability (up to $250,000);
  • Medium culpability (between $250,000 and $600,000);
  • High culpability (between $600,000 and $1,000,000); and
  • Very high culpability ($1,000,000 plus).
Mitigating factors

The High Court also provided further clarification as to in what circumstances large discounts should be made available.  Large discounts of 30% will only be provided in cases that exhibit all mitigating factors to a moderate degree, or one or more mitigating factors to a high degree.  Mitigating factors include payment of reparation, remorse and co-operation with WorkSafe, remedial actions, and favourable safety records.

Conclusion

Employers should respond immediately and appropriately to any incident.  It will be important for an employer to show the extent to which it assisted the people affected by an incident.

If you would like further information please contact Renika Siciliano on 07 958 7429.

Tax treatment of lease surrender payments to landlords

Introduction and summary

In Easy Park Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2018] NZCA 296, the Court of Appeal has affirmed that a lease surrender payment to a professional landlord is a revenue receipt under the Income Tax Act 2007 (“ITA”).

The case concerned a commercial landlord who received a payment from a tenant to allow an early termination of a lease.  The Court affirmed an earlier High Court ruling that, as the landlord was in the business of leasing property, the receipt arose from the landlord’s ordinary business activities and was therefore a revenue receipt subject to tax.

The decision provides assistance in distinguishing between capital and revenue receipts.

Background

Easy Park Limited (“the Landlord”) leased part of its building at 312 Lambton Quay, Wellington to Whitcoulls Group Limited, originally, and then to Whitcoulls 2011 Limited (“the Tenant”) by assignment.

In June 2011, the Landlord and Tenant agreed to an early termination of the lease on the basis that the Tenant would pay the Landlord $1.1 million (being approximately a third of the remaining rent).

When the Landlord filed its tax return for the 2012 financial year, it treated the payment as a capital receipt not subject to income tax.  The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (“the Commissioner”) assessed that the payment was revenue, that the Landlord had taken an unacceptable tax position, and that, accordingly, a shortfall penalty was payable in respect of the tax.

In the High Court, Ellis J upheld the Commissioner’s classification of the payment as revenue, primarily because it was received in the course of the Landlord’s ordinary business.  The payment could not be treated as capital as, from the Landord’s perspective, the reversion of the lease was temporary and did not create an asset or enduring benefit.  The Judge observed that the reversion of a lease may create such an asset or benefit in two scenarios (which did not arise here):

  • Firstly, where a lease is surrendered near the beginning of a very long term;  and
  • Secondly, where the interest returned to a landlord is so damaged or different from the original leasehold interest that had been granted, that a new lease could not easily be entered on broadly similar terms.

Ellis J quashed the Commissioner’s imposition of a shortfall penalty, finding that the tax position was not “unacceptable” under the ITA.

Appeal decision

The Court canvassed the general principles relating to the distinction between capital and revenue payments and receipts, and in largely following the reasoning of the High Court, disagreed with the Landlord’s appeal submissions.

Primarily, the Landlord argued that as consideration for the lease was factored into the Landlord’s original purchase of the building, the lease and the building constituted one identifiable capital asset in accordance with the “identifiable asset” test established in Regent Oil Co Ltd v Strick (Inspector of Taxes) [1966] AC 295 (“Regent Oil”).

The Court rejected that argument, as:

  • Regent Oil concerned the tax treatment of a payment made by a tenant from the perspective of that tenant.  The lease was considered a capital asset for the tenant as it was part of their underlying profit-making structure.  But in the case of a landlord engaged exclusively in the business of commercial leasing, a lease would be held on revenue account; and
  • On a more technical point, the Landlord’s underlying legal arrangement to purchase the building had only provided for the purchase of the fee simple interest.

The question of the shortfall penalty did not arise on appeal.

Conclusion

This case provides a reminder that a lease surrender payment to a landlord will generally be treated as revenue, not capital.

If you would like further information please contact Dale Thomas on 07 958 7428.

Contact us

HAMILTON OFFICE

P. 07 838 2079

E. reception@mccawlewis.co.nz

Level 6, 586 Victoria Street
Hamilton 3204
New Zealand

TE KŪITI OFFICE

P. 07 878 8036

E. reception@mccawlewis.co.nz

36 Taupiri Street
Te Kūiti 3910
New Zealand